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Abstract 
Connectivity within systems-of-systems often provides enhanced capabilities, but may also introduce new vulnerabilities. 
Systems engineers must therefore consider the impact of potential threats to a system, and subsequently identify methods for 
mitigating the effects of those threats. A common approach is to design for robustness, i.e. designing a system to be insensitive to 
perturbations, often through system redundancy. An alternative approach is to design for resilience, focusing on adaptation and 
the ability to recover lost capabilities. This paper represents systems-of-systems as networks and identifies thresholds in which a 
resilient network design is more cost-effective than a robust one. Resilient networks are defined with network adaptation or link 
rewiring. Robust networks are defined without adaptation, but instead have high network density or path redundancy. The 
number of initial and rewired links is used as a proxy for network cost. A command and control (C2) network of unmanned aerial 
vehicles performing a surveillance mission is used as an application problem. An agent-based model is used to simulate C2 
network performance. 
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1. Introduction 
Many of our most important engineered systems rely on networks to achieve new capabilities and improved 
performance levels. These engineered systems are often composed of many individual constituent systems, 
networked together to form a system-of-systems (SoS). Jamshidi defines SoS as “large-scale integrated systems 
which are heterogeneous and independently operable on their own, but are networked together for a common goal”1. 
A review by Gorod et al.2 notes that SoS are well represented by networks, citing the Internet, communication 
networks, and transportation networks as examples. Other commonly cited SoS characteristics are managerial and 
operational independence of constituent systems, emergence, and evolutionary development3. Though network 
connectivity is important for many SoS operations, it also exposes SoS to cyber and other traditional threats. For 
example, the loss of a data link in a search-and-rescue operation may significantly delay the rescue of an injured 
person if the pilot and operating center rely on communications with each other to coordinate the mission. The 
reliance of many SoS on networks therefore requires SoS designers to consider the ability of a network to maintain 
high performance levels in the presence of potential threats. 
Two approaches for designing an SoS capable of handling potential threats are to design for robustness and 
resilience. Robustness is a traditional design method, often focused on designing a system insensitive to 
perturbations4,5. Common approaches for robust design are Taguchi arrays and robust parameter design6, 
overdesigning to reduce failure probabilities7, and system or functional redundancy5. An alternative approach that 
has gained popularity in recent years is to design for resilience. Four common interpretations of resilience are the 
ability to rebound from a threat event, the ability to gracefully extend performance in the presence of a threat, the 
ability to continuously adapt to an environment, and the use of resilience as equivalent to robustness8. For the 
purposes of this work, we focus on the ability of an SoS to maintain performance levels by rebounding from or 
adapting to potential threats. Given this interpretation, we define a resilience-based design approach for SoS to focus 
on threat mitigation through adaptation. In comparison, a robustness approach focuses on redundancy or overdesign. 
Existing work on SoS robustness and resilience has focused on analyzing network dependencies9,10, incorporating 
system or functional redundancies11,  and designing with robust optimization methods4. Others have aimed to 
qualitatively describe design principles for achieving SoS robustness and resilience12,13. The resilience engineering 
community has contributed to this problem as well, though most of their work has focused on defining resilience 
and developing metrics for quantifying it14. There have also been various efforts assessing the resilience or 
robustness of networked infrastructure systems15–18, logistic networks19,20, communication networks21,22, and 
domain-agnostic networks23. 
This paper extends the SoS literature by incorporating cost considerations into the study of SoS robustness and 
resilience, and directly comparing the two approaches for SoS design. This cost-benefit analysis aims to improve our 
understanding of when it may be more beneficial to design an SoS using a resilient approach, rather than the more 
traditional robust one. A network-based cost metric is used as a proxy for SoS cost, and a complex networks 
approach taken to defining SoS networks. A resilience engineering metric is used to identify similarly performing 
network designs for cost comparison. A command and control (C2) network problem is used for the actual cost 
benefit analysis and comparison. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two describes the complex networks approach for 
designing SoS networks and modeling potential network threats. Section three defines the metrics used to calculate 
SoS cost and resilience or robustness. Section four presents results from the C2 network application problem. 
Section five presents conclusions and future research directions. 
2. Designing SoS as complex networks 
Due to the importance of connectivity in SoS, we represent SoS as networks. Network nodes represent 
constituent systems of an SoS, while links represent relationships between those systems. For example, nodes could 
be power  
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Fig. 1. Network adaptation with random rewiring against RD threats. (a) shows the initial network with the targeted node outlined and (b) shows 
the adapted network following the node removal with rewired links shown as dashed blue lines. (c) shows the next targeted node and (d) shows 
the subsequent adaptation. 
generators or distribution centers in a power grid, with links representing transmission lines enabling the flow of 
electricity between those systems. Similarly, a modern military force may be made up of aircraft, satellites, and an 
operating center, each represented as a node in the network, with links representing data links between assets. 
Within this framework, an SoS network design is defined by its initial network topology. SoS networks are then 
subjected to repeated attacks to assess their ability to handle potential threats. 
We take a complex networks approach towards defining SoS topologies and threats. Complex networks research 
extends traditional network theory by applying statistical methods to study real networks with non-trivial topologies, 
derived from data and observations of complex systems. One of the most commonly found properties in complex 
networks is a scale-free network topology24. Given the prevalence of scale-free topologies in real networks, we 
focus on SoS networks with scale-free initial topologies. We use the Barabási-Albert (BA) preferential attachment 
algorithm to generate scale-free topologies25. Following previous studies of complex network robustness26,27, we use 
repeated node removals to model potential threats, with one node removed at each threat event. Nodes are removed 
in a targeted manner to simulate a worst-case scenario. Node targeting is done by recalculated degree (RD), where 
the node with the highest degree (i.e. number of neighbors) is removed at each threat event. Node degrees are 
recalculated following any changes to the network. In cases where multiple nodes have the max degree in the 
network, one of those nodes is randomly removed. 
We differentiate between resilient and robust network designs by giving resilient networks the ability to adapt 
following threat events. Network adaptation is achieved through random rewiring of lost links following a node 
removal (see Figure 1). Nodes can rewire lost links to any active node in the network. Adaptation occurs 
simultaneously within the network some specified time period after a threat event. In comparison, robust networks 
are unable to adapt, but instead are designed with more initial links. This approach creates networks with high 
network densities, leading to more path redundancy. These two network designs highlight the focus on active 
recovery through adaptation in resilience engineering and the focus on passive redundancy in robust design. 
All initial network topologies are generated with the BA algorithm25, with N = 20 nodes, m0 = 2 (number of 
completely connected initial nodes), and m = 1 (number of links added with each node). Multiple robust networks 
are generated by randomly adding links to the starting scale-free topology, such that initial network densities range 
from 0.1 to 0.95. Since additional links are added randomly, these networks are no longer purely scale-free and thus 
are referred to as pseudo scale-free (pseudo-SF). Resilient networks keep the initial scale-free (SF) topology 
generated by the BA algorithm. Table 1 summarizes the design points considered in this study, where L is the 
number of initial network links and D is the initial network density. Designs one through 10 are robust network 
designs; design ten is the resilient design. 
3. Metrics for analyzing SoS networks 
The cost, C, of an SoS network design is calculated from the number of initial links and the number of links 
rewired during a time period of interest, such that 
ܥ ൌ ሺܮ ൈ ܥ௜௡௜௧௜௔௟ሻ ൅ ሺܮ௥௘௪௜௥௘ௗ ൈ ܥ௥௘௪௜௥௘ௗሻ   (1) 
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Table 1. SoS Network Experimental Design Matrix. 
Design point Topology Initial L Initial D Adaptation Threat 
1 Pseudo-SF 19 0.1 None RD 
2 Pseudo-SF 40 0.21 None RD 
3 Pseudo-SF 60 0.32 None RD 
4 Pseudo-SF 80 0.42 None RD 
5 Pseudo-SF 100 0.53 None RD 
6 Pseudo-SF 120 0.63 None RD 
7 Pseudo-SF 140 0.74 None RD 
8 Pseudo-SF 160 0.84 None RD 
9 Pseudo-SF 180 0.95 None RD 
10 SF 19 0.1 Random rewiring RD 
 
where L is the number of initial links, Cinitial is the cost of creating an initial link, Lrewired is the number of links 
rewired, and Crewired is the cost of rewiring a link. This cost metric provides a simple way of accounting for the cost 
associated with creating new links or rewiring existing ones. Varying the cost parameters, Cinitial and Crewired, allows 
one to represent a variety of network types. For example, some networks may have high costs of creating and 
rewiring links, such as power grids or highway systems. Other networks may have high initial creation but low 
rewiring costs, such as airline networks where routes can be altered once the initial infrastructure (i.e. airports and 
air traffic control) is established. These parameters allow one to identify network types in which one design might 
be more cost effective than another. 
We take a resilience engineering approach towards measuring the ability of an SoS network to mitigate node 
losses. Though resilient and robust designs take different approaches to handling threats, they both have the same 
ultimate goal of mitigating the impact of a threat on system performance. Therefore, a resilience metric is assumed 
suitable for comparisons between resilient and robust designs. We use a resilience metric calculated from SoS 
performance data, y(t). This metric uses specific data points identified from performance data, notionally shown in 
Figure 2. Using SoS performance data, the resilience metric, R, proposed by Tran28 is calculated as 
ܴ ൌ ቊߪߩൣߜ ൅ ߞ ൅ ͳ െ ߬
ሺఘିఋሻ൧
ߪߩሺߜ ൅ ߞሻ
ߩ െ ߜ ൒ Ͳ

  (2) 
where Ͳ ൑ ܴ ൑ λ and the terms in Equation 2 are referred to as resilience factors. Each resilience factor captures an 
important aspect of a resilient system. The resilience factors are calculated as 
ߪ ൌ  factor ൌ
σ ௬ሺ௧ሻ
೟೑೔೙ೌ೗
೟బ
௬ವ൫௧೑೔೙ೌ೗ି௧బ൯
   (3) 
ߜ ൌ absorption factor ൌ ௬೘೔೙
௬ವ
   (4) 
ߩ ൌ recovery factor ൌ ௬ೃ
௬ವ
   (5) 
߬ ൌ  factor ൌ ௧ೄೄି௧బ
௧೑೔೙ೌ೗ି௧బ
   (6) 
ߞ ൌ  factor ൌ ଵ
ଵାሾି଴Ǥଶହሺௌேோ೏ಳିଵହሻሿ
   (7) 
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Fig. 2. Notional SoS performance data, y(t), with a single threat event over a period of interest from t0 to tfinal. The minimum performance level is 
ymin. Steady-state is achieved at time tSS with a recovered performance level of yR. The desired performance level is yD. 
where ȗ applies a logistic function transformation to signal-to-noise calculated from the performance data y(t). This 
metric aims to capture the ability of an SoS to maintain a high level of performance throughout a threat event, 
recovering to its initial desired performance levels if degraded. 
Since we consider multiple node removal events, a total resilience metric, Rtotal, is calculated from individual R 
values. Each individual R value is associated with its own node removal time period (i.e. calculated using Equation 
2). Individual R values are then averaged together using an exponentially weighted mean to calculate Rtotal as 
ܴ௧௢௧௔௟ ൌ σ
௪೔
σ ௪ೕ
ಿ೅
ೕసభ
ܴ௜
ே೅
௜ୀଵ    (8) 
where NT is the number of threat events (i.e. node removals) and the weights, wi, are coefficients of an exponentially 
weighted moving average, defined as 
ݓ௜ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߙሻே೅ି௜   (9) 
with smoothing factor Į = 0.06. A thorough discussion of the development of these resilience metrics, along with a 
parameterized study of their behaviors given varying performance datasets, is given by Tran28. 
4. Command and control network application 
A military C2 network application is used to perform the cost-benefit analysis of resilient and robust network 
designs. A C2 network is defined by the structure of the communication network between military assets. C2 
networks are essential for efficient military operations, yet face many traditional and cyber threats. Stringent 
military budgets require these networks to be designed to handle potential threats in a cost effective manner. We 
focus on a scenario in which a team of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is tasked with maintaining surveillance 
over a set of adversaries in a specified battlefield (see the notional scenario depiction in Figure 3). The UAVs are 
networked together to enable communications, primarily sharing known locations of adversaries. In this SoS 
network, nodes represent UAVs and links represent data links. An agent-based model is used to simulate and 
compare the performance of the network designs described in Table 1. The model contains three types of agents: 
UAVs, adversaries, and neutrals. Simulations include 20 agents of each type. All agents move within a square 
battlefield split into 36 search grids. UAVs attempt to maintain awareness of the location (i.e. current search grid) of 
other agents in the battlefield by sensing nearby agents and sharing information with teammates. Messages sent 
between agents are either received or dropped; corrupted or false messages are not considered. Network attacks 
occur every 200 time steps in a simulation; network adaptation occurs 100 time steps after each attack. The agent-
based model is developed in NetLogo29. 
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C2 performance is measured with an awareness metric, A(t), calculated using Shannon’s information entropy. 
Awareness is normalized to be within [0, 1]. The metric is formulated such that a UAV with complete uncertainty of  
 
Fig. 3. C2 network composed of UAVs performing a surveillance mission. Data links are shown as dashed blue lines and UAV sensing areas are 
shown as red highlighted areas. 
the locations of all others agents of interest at time t has an awareness A(t) = 0. In this context, complete uncertainty 
means the UAV gives all other agents a 1/36 probability of being in each search grid. A UAV with an awareness 
A(t) = 1 would have complete certainty of the current grid of every agent of interest. The mean awareness of all 
UAVs is used as the performance data in resilience metric calculations. See Tran et al.30 for a thorough description 
of the agent-based model and awareness metric. 
Figure 4 shows a comparison of total resilience and network cost for the 10 network designs considered in Table 
1. Due the stochastic nature of the agent-based model, 50 replications are run for each design point. Results shown 
are calculated from the mean of all 50 replications. Figure 4a shows the effect of increasing initial network density 
(i.e. moving from design one to design nine) on total resilience. As expected, Rtotal improves with network density 
due to an increasing number of communication paths between UAVs. Results also show a point of diminishing 
returns where further increasing density provides little gain in resilience. The total resilience of the resilient network 
(design 10) is also shown for comparison with an Rtotal of 1.71. Design three, the robust network with 60 initial links, 
has a similar Rtotal of 1.74. Since these networks provide similar performance measured by Rtotal, they are used for a 
cost comparison in Figure 4b. Figure 4b shows how changing the ratio of the cost for creating an initial link to the 
cost of rewiring a link affects the cost of the resilient (design 10) and robust (design three) networks. The data 
shown is obtained from the same simulation data as Figure 4a, except that the cost calculation parameters have been 
altered to compare the cost of these two network designs. The robust network is insensitive to the cost parameter 
ratio because it cannot rewire links and therefore has no rewiring costs. Results show that when the ratio of initial to 
rewired costs is less than 1.5, the resilient network has lower cost with similar Rtotal, suggesting it is more cost 
effective in those cases. However, if the cost ratio is above 1.5, the robust network is more cost effective. 
 
 
Fig. 4. (a) shows total resilience for the robust (black circles) and resilient (dashed blue line) network designs as a function of initial network 
density. (b) shows network cost as a function of the ratio of initial and rewired link costs. 
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5. Conclusion 
Modern SoS operations are highly dependent upon connectivity for performance. This reliance on networks 
creates a need to identify methods for designing SoS capable of mitigating the effects of potential threats. The 
importance of connectivity in SoS enables their representation as networks. As such, we take a complex networks 
view of this problem and define SoS networks to be based on a scale-free topology, with network threats modeled as 
targeted node removals. Resilient designs use network adaptation to handle threats, while robust designs use path 
redundancy through high levels of network density. These network designs are compared using a C2 network agent-
based simulation. A network-based cost metric is used with a resilience metric calculated from performance data to 
provide a cost-benefit analysis of resilient and robust network designs. This analysis shows that if the cost of 
creating an initial link is at least 1.5 times the cost of rewiring a link, the resilient network is more cost effective. 
These results provide a guideline for identifying when a resilience-based SoS network design approach may be more 
appropriate than a robustness-based approach. 
Limitations of this work include the assumption of node homogeneity (i.e. all nodes within an SoS network have 
the same capabilities and are equally important to the SoS, other than differences in connectivity) and a limited 
exploration of possible network designs. The use of a single resilience metric to compare network designs also limits 
the conclusions one can draw from this work, as other measures of performance may shift the cost effectiveness of 
various networks. Additionally, the focus on network construction and link rewiring costs does not account for many 
other costs associated with the design and operation of SoS (e.g. costs related to system failures or reduced data 
integrity from cyber attacks). Future research will aim to address these limitations by considering nodes with 
varying system properties, defining a more thorough design space, considering additional comparison metrics (e.g. 
topological properties commonly used in network analysis), and expanding the cost considerations. Future work will 
also consider a hybrid design approach that concurrently implements robustness and resilience into SoS networks 
(e.g. providing redundancy for critical or rigid systems and adaptation for highly interoperable ones). 
Acknowledgements 
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 16-1901. 
References 
1. Jamshidi, M. in Syst. Syst. Eng. Princ. Appl. (Jamshidi, M.) (Taylor & Francis, 2009). 
2. Gorod, A., Sauser, B. & Boardman, J. System-of-Systems Engineering Management: A Review of Modern History and a Path Forward. 
IEEE Syst. J. 2, 484–499 (2008). 
3. Keating, C. B. & Katina, P. F. Systems of systems engineering: prospects and challenges for the emerging field. Int. J. Syst. Syst. Eng. 2, 
234–256 (2011). 
4. Davendralingam, N. & DeLaurentis, D. A Robust Optimization Framework to Architecting System of Systems. Procedia Comput. Sci. 16, 
255–264 (2013). 
5. Alderson, D. L. & Doyle, J. C. Contrasting Views of Complexity and Their Implications For Network-Centric Infrastructures. IEEE Trans. 
Syst. Man, Cybern. - Part A Syst. Humans 40, 839–852 (2010). 
6. Myers, R. H., Montgomery, D. C. & Anderson-Cook, C. M. Response Surface Methodology. (John Wiley & Sons, 2009). 
7. Neches, R. & Madni, A. M. Towards Affordably Adaptable and Effective Systems. Syst. Eng. 16, 224–234 (2013). 
8. Woods, D. D. Four concepts for resilience and the implications for the future of resilience engineering. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 141, 5–9 
(2015). 
9. Filippini, R. & Silva, A. A modeling framework for the resilience analysis of networked systems-of-systems based on functional 
dependencies. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 125, 82–91 (2014). 
10. Eusgeld, I., Nan, C. & Dietz, S. ‘System-of-systems’ approach for interdependent critical infrastructures. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 96, 679–686 
(2011). 
11. Uday, P. & Marais, K. Exploiting Stand-in Redundancy to Improve Resilience in a System-of-Systems (SoS). Procedia Comput. Sci. 16, 
532–541 (2013). 
12. Uday, P. & Marais, K. Designing Resilient Systems-of-Systems: A Survey of Metrics, Methods, and Challenges. Syst. Eng. 18, 491–510 
(2015). 
13. Jackson, S. & Ferris, T. L. J. Resilience Principles for Engineered Systems. Syst. Eng. 16, 152–64 (2013). 
14. Righi, A. W., Saurin, T. A. & Wachs, P. A systematic literature review of resilience engineering: Research areas and a research agenda 
proposal. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 141, 142–152 (2015). 
15. Reed, D. A., Kapur, K. C. & Christie, R. D. Methodology for Assessing the Resilience of Networked Infrastructure. IEEE Syst. J. 3, 174–180 
(2009). 
133 Huy T. Tran et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  95 ( 2016 )  126 – 133 
16. Omer, M., Nilchiani, R. & Mostashari, A. Measuring the resilience of the trans-oceanic telecommunication cable system. IEEE Syst. J. 3, 
295–303 (2009). 
17. Attoh-Okine, N. O., Cooper, A. T. & Mensah, S. a. Formulation of resilience index of urban infrastructure using belief functions. IEEE Syst. 
J. 3, 147–153 (2009). 
18. Scholz, J. C. & Greiner, M. O. W. Topology control with IPD network creation games. New J. Phys. 9, 185–185 (2007). 
19. Wang, D. & Ip, W. H. Evaluation and Analysis of Logistic Network Resilience With Application to Aircraft Servicing. IEEE Syst. J. 3, 166–
173 (2009). 
20. Zhao, K., Kumar, A., Harrison, T. P. & Yen, J. Analyzing the Resilience of Complex Supply Network Topologies Against Random and 
Targeted Disruptions. IEEE Syst. J. 5, 28–39 (2011). 
21. Sterbenz, J. P. G. et al. Resilience and survivability in communication networks: Strategies, principles, and survey of disciplines. Comput. 
Networks 54, 1245–1265 (2010). 
22. Sterbenz, J. P. G. et al. Evaluation of network resilience, survivability, and disruption tolerance: analysis, topology generation, simulation, 
and experimentation. Telecommun. Syst. 52, 705–736 (2013). 
23. Kim, H. & Anderson, R. An Experimental Evaluation of Robustness of Networks. IEEE Syst. J. 7, 179–188 (2013). 
24. Barabási, A.-L., Albert, R. & Jeong, H. Scale-free characteristics of random networks: the topology of the world-wide web. Phys. A Stat. 
Mech. its Appl. 281, 69–77 (2000). 
25. Barabási, A. & Albert, R. Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks. Science 286, 509–512 (1999). 
26. Albert, R., Jeong, H. & Barabasi, A.-L. Error and attack tolerance of complex networks. Nature 406, 378–82 (2000). 
27. Holme, P., Kim, B. J., Yoon, C. N. & Han, S. K. Attack vulnerability of complex networks. Phys. Rev. E. Stat. Nonlin. Soft Matter Phys. 65, 
056109 (2002). 
28. Tran, H. T. A Complex Networks Approach to Designing Resilient System-of-Systems. Ph.D. Thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology 
(2015). 
29. Wilensky, U. (1999). NetLogo. http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/. Center for Connected Learning and Computer-Based Modeling, 
Northwestern University, Evanston, IL. 
30. Tran, H. T., Domercant, J. C. & Mavris, D. N. Evaluating the agility of adaptive command and control networks from a cyber complex 
adaptive systems perspective. J. Def. Model. Simul. Appl. Methodol. Technol. (2015). doi:10.1177/1548512915592517 
 
